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Foreword and 
Acknowledgments
For many people, drug use, in and of itself, is morally repugnant and they 
will react strongly against any proposal that does not strongly condemn all 
use of drugs.
— Howard Rahtz1
Most of the arguments that have been marshaled against drugs have little 
basis in logic.
— Andrew Weil2
Sometime during the writing of this book, it occurred to me that its cen-tral question, “Is recreational drug use morally wrong?,” has something 
in common with a question of a very different sort: “Is closing one’s eyes 
while driving a car morally wrong?” What they have in common is this: 
though both questions are rather straightforward, their answers are far 
from it. To see this, consider the latter question first. One might be tempted 
to provide a simple “yes” or “no” answer to it, perhaps even without hesita-
tion, but such would be a mistake, or so it seems to me. As I see it, whether 
it is morally wrong to close one’s eyes while driving a car depends on a wide 
variety of factors including why one does so, for how long one does so, how 
fast one is driving when one does so, how experienced a driver one is when 
one does so, on what one is driving when one does so (a street, a desert, 
etc.), with whom one is driving when one does so (nobody else or some-
body else), in what environment one is driving when one does so (nothing 
of value is in proximity or something of value is in proximity), and more. 
Given this, answering the question “Is closing one’s eyes while driving a 
car morally wrong?” requires nuance. To wit, one might think that it is not 
morally wrong to do so as a very experienced driver for one second while 
driving two miles per hour alone through a desert but that it is morally 
wrong to do so as a very inexperienced driver for ten seconds while driving 
forty miles per hour with kids in one’s car through midtown Manhattan. 
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All this to say, though the question “Is closing one’s eyes while driving a car 
morally wrong?” is rather straightforward, its answer is not.
And so it is with the question of this book— “Is recreational drug use 
morally wrong?”— or so I shall argue. As with the previously mentioned 
question, one might be tempted to provide a simple “yes” or “no” answer 
to this question, but such would be a mistake. Whether it is morally wrong 
to use drugs recreationally depends on a wide variety of factors, I submit, 
including why one does so, for how long one does so, how experienced a 
recreational drug user one is when one does so, around whom one does so 
(nobody else or somebody else), in what environment one does so (noth-
ing of value is in proximity or something of value is in proximity), which 
drugs one uses recreationally, and more. Indeed, those are just some of the 
harm- based factors, and whether it is morally wrong to use drugs recre-
ationally is a function of non- harm- based factors as well.
I note this similarity between these two questions in order to provide 
you, the reader, with a glimpse of the complexity of the issue at hand.
I would like to thank the following people and institutions, all of whom, 
in one way or another, played an important role in the development of 
this book: Greg Tateosian, Ryan Oden, Adam Rzepka, Anthony Hall, Sarah 
Holyhead, Michael Tooley, Jeff Reiman, Ed. L. Miller, Peter Simpson, Bar-
bara Montero, Mark White, College of Staten Island, students of my Spring 
2015 Philosophical Thinking course, students of the Spring 2014 senior 
philosophy colloquium at Davidson College, Björn Petersson, Filosofiska 
Föreningen at Lund University, an anonymous reviewer, and my wife Lucia 
Scheckner.
Special thanks go to Steve Morris, who read and commented on an early 
draft of the book.
Finally, I would like to thank the person to whom this book is dedicated, 
Paul Studtmann. In addition to encouraging me to write this book, Paul 
provided me with very helpful comments throughout the entire writing 
process. Thanks, Paul— drinks are on me.
1Introduction
Introduction
Is recreational drug use morally wrong? In this book, I examine argu-ments for the view that it is and contend that, by and large, they do not 
succeed.
The question of recreational drug use’s moral status is, to borrow a 
phrase from James Bakalar and Lester Grinspoon, a “monstrous tangle” 
of moral, legal, economic, psychological, pharmacological, sociological, 
philosophical, neurological, and logical issues (among others).1 Given this, 
it behooves me to distinguish the question “Is recreational drug use mor-
ally wrong?” from two other questions that often arise in debates on recre-
ational drug use: “Is recreational drug use imprudent?” and “Is recreational 
drug use an activity that should be illegal?” The former question should 
not be confused with either of the latter questions, as the moral status 
of recreational drug use, or any other activity for that matter, is distinct 
from its prudential and legal statuses, at least in principle.2 To motivate 
this, it would help to consider another activity. Take, for instance, riding a 
motorcycle while not wearing a helmet— the moral, prudential, and legal 
statuses of doing so are, in principle, distinct. It is logically consistent for 
one to hold that riding a motorcycle while not wearing a helmet is not 
morally wrong though it is imprudent and should be illegal, that it is mor-
ally wrong though it is not imprudent and should not be illegal, or some 
other combination of these statuses. Even if one’s answer to the question 
of whether it is morally wrong to ride a motorcycle while not wearing a 
helmet is “no,” then, one may still deem it to be imprudent, an activity that 
should be illegal, or both.
And so it is with every other activity. From fasting to bungee jump-
ing, committing suicide to prostituting, self- flagellating to using drugs 
recreationally— the moral, prudential, and legal statuses of an activity 
are, in principle, distinct. Regarding the activity at issue here, it is logically 
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consistent for one to hold that recreational drug use is not morally wrong 
though it is imprudent and should be illegal, that it is morally wrong 
though it is not imprudent and should not be illegal, or some other com-
bination of these statuses. So similar to before, even if one’s answer to the 
question of whether it is morally wrong to use drugs recreationally is “no,” 
one may still deem recreational drug use to be imprudent, an activity that 
should be illegal, or both.
I raise the distinctions among the moral, prudential, and legal statuses of 
recreational drug use so as to ensure that the following is clear: by address-
ing the question of whether recreational drug use is morally wrong, I am 
not thereby automatically addressing the questions of whether recreational 
drug use is imprudent or whether recreational drug use should be illegal. 
Having said that, I want to ensure that something else is equally clear: by 
addressing the question of whether recreational drug use is morally wrong, 
I am thereby automatically addressing the question of whether recreational 
drug use should be illegal on the grounds that it is morally wrong. And if 
my objections to the arguments for the moral wrongness of recreational 
drug use are sound, then these arguments are largely unsuccessful and, 
to that extent, the moral case for legally prohibiting recreational drug use 
is undermined. Of course, there might be nonmoral reasons— economic 
or pragmatic, perhaps— for legally prohibiting recreational drug use. But 
whether there are I leave for others to decide. (For my two cents on whether 
recreational drug use should be legally prohibited, see the afterword.)
With the preceding in mind, you might be wondering why I have cho-
sen to address the question of whether recreational drug use is morally 
wrong rather than the questions of whether it is imprudent or whether 
it should be illegal. This brings me to one of the purposes of this chap-
ter, which is motivating the issue of recreational drug use’s moral status. 
The other purposes of this chapter include defining key terms, presenting 
types of arguments for the moral wrongness of recreational drug use, and 
describing my method for evaluating arguments for the moral wrongness 
of recreational drug use. Each of these things will be done in turn.
Motivating the Issue
In 2009, the most decorated Olympian of all time, Michael Phelps, released 
a statement to the Associated Press in which he admitted to “regrettable” 
behavior that “demonstrated bad judgment” and promised his fans and the 
public that “it will not happen again.”3 The behavior to which he was refer-
ring was that of smoking marijuana. Phelps released the statement after 
a photograph of him taking a hit from a bong went viral on the Internet.
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The public reaction to Phelps’s use of pot was mixed. Some people 
condemned it as immoral (and reckless, and stupid, and juvenile), others 
welcomed it, while still others were indifferent toward it. For example, at 
one extreme, a particularly disappointed follower of Phelps declared, “I 
was disgusted, to say the least, when I found out about his immoral drug 
use activity.”4 At the other extreme, comedian Bill Maher remarked, “Who 
deserves to just sit back and have a bong more than Michael Phelps? I 
mean, for the last eight years he’s done nothing but marinate in chlorine.”5
The public reaction to Phelps’s subsequent statement was mixed as well. 
Some people accepted it, others rejected it, while still others were, again, 
indifferent. Subway, the fast food restaurant franchise and one of Phelps’s 
sponsors, issued the following statement: “Like most Americans, and like 
Michael Phelps himself, we were disappointed in his behavior. Also like 
most Americans, we accept his apology.”6 On the other hand, in “What 
Michael Phelps Should Have Said,” an article in which the author assumes 
Phelps’s identity, Radley Balko wrote, “I take it back. I don’t apologize. 
Because you know what? It’s none of your goddamned business. I work my 
ass off 10 months a year. It’s that hard work that gave you all those gooey 
feelings of patriotism last summer. If during my brief window of down 
time I want to relax, enjoy myself, and partake of a substance that’s a hell 
of a lot less bad for me than alcohol, tobacco, or, frankly, most of the pre-
scription drugs most of you are taking, well, you can spare me the lecture.”7 
There was, then, a wide variety of reactions to Phelps’s smoking marijuana 
as well as to his subsequent apology for doing so. And of these various reac-
tions, Phelps sided, at least in word if not also in deed, with those who con-
demned his behavior and approved of his promise never to use pot again.
I invoke this incident— this “scandal,” as it was labelled at the time— for 
two reasons. First, it shows just how controversial the moral status of rec-
reational drug use can be. I write “can be” deliberately, since whether and 
to what extent recreational drug use’s moral status is controversial depends 
on the drug in question, among other things. Had Phelps been smoking a 
cigarette while drinking a Rum and Coke instead— that is, had Phelps been 
using tobacco, alcohol, and caffeine recreationally— his doing so almost 
certainly would not have been deemed scandalous. To be sure, some people 
might have been surprised that one of if not the greatest Olympians could 
be so competitively successful while using these drugs— and they are just 
that, drugs (to be addressed later). But hardly anyone— any Westerner at 
any rate— would have considered it a scandal. And in any case, his recre-
ational use of these drugs would not have been remotely as controversial as 
was his recreational use of marijuana. Indeed, it is public knowledge that 
Phelps drinks alcohol recreationally, but in and of itself, his doing so has 
not been deemed scandalous.8
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This brings us to the second reason that I invoke the Phelps scandal— 
namely, the possibility of inconsistent beliefs people may have regarding the 
moral status of recreational drug use. Phelps is not alone in his recreational 
drug use, after all, billions of people around the world use drugs recre-
ationally. As Douglas Husak writes, “[N]o known societies— except per-
haps that of Eskimos— refrain from using drugs for recreational purposes. 
Drug use is so pervasive that researchers such as Andrew Weil have specu-
lated that the desire to alter consciousness periodically is an innate, normal 
drive analogous to hunger or sex.”9 Granted, some of the drugs people use 
recreationally are legal, such as caffeine, tobacco, and alcohol— at least, as 
with tobacco and alcohol, legal for some people to use. In the United States, 
the geographical focus of this book, for instance, 80 percent of adults con-
sume caffeine each day.10 A little more than half of Americans aged 12 and 
older reported being current (within the past month) drinkers of alcohol 
in 2012, amounting to an estimated 135.5 million people.11 And an esti-
mated 69.5 million Americans were current users of a tobacco product, 
57.5 million of which were current cigarette smokers. What’s more, given 
that these statistics regard only individuals who were current users, it is safe 
to say that the number of users of each of these drugs was much greater.
But some of the drugs people use recreationally are illegal, such as 
Phelps’s drug of choice, marijuana, as well as cocaine, ecstasy, heroin, and 
so on. According to sociologist Angus Bancroft, “Millions of people of all 
backgrounds around the world take illicit drugs regularly and unremark-
ably.”12 To wit, it is estimated that 23.9 million Americans were current 
illegal drug users in 2012. Marijuana was the most commonly used illegal 
drug, with an estimated 18.9 million current users. Current cocaine use 
was reported by 1.6 million people. The estimated number of persons who 
were past- year heroin users (669,000) was much higher than the estimated 
number of persons who were past- year heroin users in 2007 (373,000). 
And 80 to 90 million Americans have used an illegal drug at least once in 
their lifetime.13
Given the preceding statistics, it is clear that, like Phelps, many Ameri-
cans use drugs recreationally, whether legal drugs, illegal drugs, or both. 
Hence Charles Faupel et al.’s claim, “Ours is a country of drug users.”14 
With this in mind, a question arises: Is it consistent for one to believe 
that Phelps’s recreational use of marijuana is morally condemnable while 
believing that his recreational use of alcohol is not? More specifically, is 
it consistent for one to hold that Phelps’s recreational use of marijuana 
per se, independent of its legal status in particular, is morally condem-
nable while holding that his recreational use of alcohol per se is not? Some 
doubt that it is. Take Ethan Nadelmann, executive director of the Drug 
Policy Alliance, for example. He writes, “Most Americans perceive the drug 
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problem as a moral issue and draw a moral distinction between use of the 
illicit drugs and use of alcohol and tobacco. Yet when one subjects this 
distinction to reasonable analysis, it quickly disintegrates . . . The ‘moral’ 
condemnation of some substances and not others proves to be little more 
than a prejudice in favor of some drugs and against others.”15 Of course, 
Nadelmann’s comments notwithstanding, it might be consistent for one to 
believe that Phelps’s recreational use of marijuana per se is morally con-
demnable while believing that his recreational use of alcohol per se is not. 
But it is only if there is a morally relevant difference between the two activi-
ties that renders the one but not the other morally condemnable. And one 
wonders whether there is such a difference.
Not only is recreational drug use’s moral status controversial, then, 
but the controversy itself might also be a function of inconsistent beliefs 
people may have regarding it.16 These two considerations alone are reason 
enough to delve more deeply into the issue. But there is a third reason, one 
pertaining to the view that the possession and use of drugs such as mari-
juana, cocaine, and heroin ought to be illegal and, indeed, criminal. Since 
this view generally corresponds to both federal and state laws in the United 
States (with a few recent exceptions), I will refer to it as the “status quo 
position.”17 One of the most popular grounds for the status quo position is 
that the use of such drugs is morally wrong. As Robert MacCoun and Peter 
Reuter write, “Many of the arguments in the legalization debate involve 
empirical matters— either evaluative descriptions of the status quo or pre-
dictions about the likely consequences of a change in policy. But purely 
moral arguments also play a prominent role. Many prohibitionists assert 
that drugs should be banned because drug use per se is immoral.”18 Indeed, 
as Elizabeth Price Foley sees it, the moral wrongness of using such drugs 
recreationally is not simply one of the grounds for the status quo posi-
tion, it is the only ground: “Why does American law allow carte blanche 
consumption of tobacco, caffeine, sugar, saccharin . . . yet completely 
prohibit the consumption of other harmful substances? The answer lies 
not in any difference in the potential for harm posed by these products, 
but merely in the perceived morality— or more precisely, immorality— of 
their consumption.”19 Whether the (alleged) moral wrongness of the rec-
reational use of drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin is just one of 
the grounds for the status quo position or the only ground, many people 
believe that the recreational use of such drugs is morally wrong and, in 
turn, should be a criminal offense. And since the recreational use of these 
drugs entails possession of them, they hold that the possession of these 
drugs should be a criminal offense as well. Such individuals hold, then, that 
there are good reasons— specifically, good moral reasons— for criminaliz-
ing the possession and use of drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin.
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Those who embrace this morality- based defense of the status quo 
position not only are great in number but also occupy a wide variety of 
positions in society, ranging from professors to presidents, policemen to 
priests. Many of them invoke this morality- based defense explicitly. For 
example, William Bennett, former federal director of drug policy, writes, 
“I find no merit in the legalizers’ case. The simple fact is that drug use is 
wrong. And the moral argument, in the end, is the most compelling argu-
ment.”20 Former president George H. W. Bush claims that “legalizing drugs 
would completely undermine the message that drug use is wrong.”21 Social 
scientist James Q. Wilson argues, “If we believe— as I do— that dependency 
on certain mind- altering drugs is a moral issue, and that their illegality 
rests in part on their immorality, then legalizing them undercuts, if it does 
not eliminate altogether, the moral message.”22 And philosophy profes-
sor Edwin Delattre contends that “drugs are not wrong because they are 
illegal— they are illegal because they are wrong.”23
But some of them invoke this morality- based defense implicitly, or so it 
seems. Consider, for example, individuals who explicitly invoke a health- 
based defense of the status quo position. Briefly, such individuals hold that 
the recreational use of drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin should 
be illegal on the grounds that it is unhealthy for the user. In his “5 Rea-
sons Marijuana Should Remain Illegal,” for instance, John Hawkins lists 
the following as his fourth reason: “Marijuana is terrible for your physi-
cal health.”24 Now, a health- based defense of the status quo position is not 
explicitly moralistic. There is reason to believe, however, that it is implicitly 
moralistic, at least for some of its advocates. For some of its advocates deem 
other activities to be unhealthy for the agent as well, presumably— such as 
eating junk food, drinking alcohol, or smoking cigarettes— yet they do not 
believe that these activities also should be illegal.25 But if such individu-
als’ defense of the status quo position were grounded strictly in the claim 
that the recreational use of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin is unhealthy 
for the user, then, all else being equal, they ought to hold that eating junk 
food, drinking alcohol, or smoking cigarettes also should be illegal. The 
fact that they do not do so indicates that they don’t think that all else is, in 
fact, equal. What, then, do they take to be the difference between the rec-
reational use of drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin, on the one 
hand, and eating junk food, drinking alcohol, or smoking cigarettes, on the 
other, such that the former should be illegal but the latter should not? They 
might cite a number of differences, of course, but no doubt some of them 
will cite a moral difference between these activities, deeming the former 
to be morally wrong or otherwise morally problematic and the latter to be 
morally permissible.
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Whether it is invoked explicitly or implicitly, then, one of the most 
popular grounds for the status quo position is that the recreational use of 
drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin is morally wrong (hereafter, 
simply “wrong”). With this morality- based defense of the status quo posi-
tion in mind, a question immediately comes to mind: Is the recreational 
use of drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, heroin wrong? Despite the strong 
rhetoric from morality- based prohibitionists and other moral critics of 
recreational drug use, it is surprisingly difficult to discern the reasons they 
have for believing that it is so. Most of the time, no reasons are even pro-
vided; it is simply declared that using such drugs recreationally is wrong. 
As Husak writes, “These allegations must be addressed directly; persons 
who insist that illicit drug use is wrongful are owed a reply. A philosopher 
would like to respond to their arguments. Unfortunately, arguments for the 
alleged immorality of drug use are almost never produced; this judgment 
is typically put forward as a kind of brute moral fact or uncontrovertible 
moral intuition.”26 Bennett’s earlier declaration, “The simple fact is that 
drug use is wrong,” epitomizes this tendency.
Indeed, often the closest that moral critics of recreational drug use come 
to offering reasons for holding that recreational drug use is wrong is when 
they say things such as “Drugs are bad for you, so you should not use them 
recreationally.” But whether this set of claims constitutes an argument for the 
wrongness of using drugs recreationally is unclear, since the “should” involved 
in it is ambiguous— it could be a prudential “should” or a moral “should.”27 
As Alan Gerwith puts the distinction, a “should” is prudential “when it serves 
or upholds the agent’s or the speaker’s own interests or purposes,” while a 
“should” is moral “when it serves or upholds the interests or purposes of at 
least some person or persons other than or in addition to the agent or the 
speaker.”28 More precisely, a prudential “should” depends simply on the 
agent’s desires, interests, purposes, or needs— that is, what one should do, 
prudentially speaking, turns merely on one’s desires, interests, purposes, or 
needs. A moral “should,” on the other hand, does not depend simply on the 
agent’s desires, interests, purposes, or needs; rather, it depends partly on oth-
ers’ desires, interests, purposes, or needs.29 What one should do, then, morally 
speaking, turns partly on the desires, interests, purposes, or needs of others.
With the preceding distinction in mind, consider once more the set of 
claims “Drugs are bad for you, so you should not use them recreationally.” 
Again, whether this set of claims constitutes an argument for the wrong-
ness of using drugs recreationally is unclear. For the “should” involved in 
the second claim could be a prudential “should,” in which case the claim 
is to be understood that it is imprudent to use drugs recreationally— that 
is, using drugs recreationally is something you should not do given your 
desires, interests, purposes, or needs. Or it could be a moral “should,” in 
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which case the claim is to be understood that it is wrong to use drugs 
recreationally— that is, using drugs recreationally is something you should 
not do regardless of your desires, interests, purposes, or needs. And moral 
critics of recreational drug use rarely state explicitly which sense of “should” 
they have in mind. In any case, much more than the preceding is needed if 
one is to determine whether using drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, and 
heroin recreationally is in fact wrong.
To be sure, not everyone agrees that the recreational use of drugs such as 
marijuana, cocaine, and heroin is wrong. “Cocaine gives a sense of exhila-
ration, heroin a glow, a warmth, and marijuana a sense of relaxation and 
ease. What then is wrong?,” asks Robert Sweet, a federal district judge.30 
Similarly, Husak maintains that “there is nothing inherently wrong with a 
person’s altering his states of consciousness for the purpose of relaxation, 
enjoyment, or self- exploration.”31 Yet as is the case with moral critics of 
recreational drug use, it is surprisingly difficult to discern the reasons such 
naysayers have for holding that the recreational use of these drugs is not 
wrong. Given the morality- based defense of the status quo position, espe-
cially when considered alongside recreational drug use’s prevalence and 
the possibility of inconsistent beliefs people may have regarding its moral 
status, one would think that much has been written on the topic of the pos-
sible wrongness of using drugs recreationally. Oddly, such is not the case. 
Indeed, I am not aware of anyone who has systematically and thoroughly 
examined arguments for the wrongness of recreational drug use. Husak 
claims that David Richards “may be the only philosopher to have addressed 
these arguments in detail,” referring to Richards’s Sex, Drugs, Death, and 
the Law, published in 1982. Yet Richards addresses just five arguments for 
the wrongness of recreational drug use, by my count, and over the course 
of just 17 pages at that.32 On both sides of the debate on recreational drug 
use’s moral status, then, there is a paucity of argumentation.33
As a result of these things:
 • Recreational drug use is pervasive.
 • People may have inconsistent beliefs with regard to its moral status.
 • One of the most popular defenses of the status quo position is 
morality- based.
 • Seemingly no one has systematically and thoroughly examined 
arguments for the wrongness of recreational drug use.
There is an important gap in the debate on recreational drug use that needs 
to be filled, that of recreational drug use’s moral status and, specifically, 
whether it is ever wrong. Attempting to fill this gap is the purpose of this 
book. But before doing so, I need to provide the backdrop against which the 
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rest of this book is to be understood and evaluated. This brings me to the 
rest of the purposes for this chapter, which, again, are defining key terms, 
presenting types of arguments for the wrongness of recreational drug use, 
and describing the method to be employed here for evaluating arguments 
for the wrongness of recreational drug use. I begin with defining key terms.
Defining Key Terms
Answering the question of whether recreational drug use is ever wrong 
requires understanding a number of key terms, including “drug,” “recre-
ational drug use,” and “wrong.” Each of these terms will be defined in turn.
As many people agree— philosophers, pharmacologists, sociologists, 
and more— defining “drug” can be more challenging than one might ini-
tially think.34 To motivate this, consider the definition of “drug” provided 
by sociologist Eric Goode: “A drug is something that has been defined by 
certain segments of the society as a drug.”35 Notice that the very thing that 
Goode is attempting to define, “drug,” is constitutive of the definition itself. 
Goode’s definition of “drug,” then, is circular and thereby inadequate.
But even definitions that are not circular are often inadequate. Consider 
the following definition of “drug” provided by the UN Office on Drug and 
Crime (UNODC): “A substance that people take to change the way they 
feel, think or behave.”36 This definition is problematic for a number of rea-
sons. First, it entails that food is— or, at least, can be— a drug, a view that 
some scholars reject.37 Second, it suggests (incredibly) that the reason for 
taking the substance determines whether or not the substance is a drug. 
Even if one is not taking aspirin to change the way one feels, thinks, or 
behaves— that is, even if one is taking aspirin on a whim— aspirin (specifi-
cally its active ingredient, acetylsalicylic acid) remains a drug, ostensibly. 
Finally, the definition is overly vague. As Bancroft writes, “[I]ts notion of 
‘changing’ how one feels, thinks or behaves is tricky. Would that include 
restoring normal service? Or does it purely refer to changes away from the 
mental status quo that apply? Some drugs are used to restore balance, to 
make the body/mind conform to an ideal of normality. Would an addict 
taking heroin to feel normal, capable of everyday interaction and activity, 
therefore not be using it as a drug?”38 With problems such as these in mind, 
the UNODC’s definition of “drug” is less than adequate. And so it is with 
most other definitions of “drug”; indeed, Husak goes so far as to claim that 
“no adequate definition of a drug exists.”39 (Perhaps this explains why one 
scientist quips that “drug” should be defined as “any substance that, when 
injected into an animal, produced a scientific paper.”40)
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Despite the difficulty of defining “drug,” I would be remiss not to pro-
pose a definition to serve as a touchstone for the rest of the book. So to 
begin with, and to narrow the scope, the drugs I have in mind are specifi-
cally psychoactive drugs— that is, drugs “that change cognition, behavior, 
and emotions by changing the functioning of the brain.”41 By “drug,” then, 
I mean a substance that has psychoactive effects, effects on the brain result-
ing in the stimulation or dulling of the senses, the promotion of a feeling 
of euphoria, the altering of perception, or other.42
As with the preceding definitions of “drug,” my definition of “drug” is 
not without its own problems. To begin with, not every substance that we 
consider a drug has psychoactive effects. For example, atorvastatin, widely 
known by the trade name “Lipitor,” is a substance that we consider a drug 
though it has no psychoactive effects.43 This is not a significant problem for 
present purposes, however, as the drugs that I will be focusing on here do 
have psychoactive effects.
Another problem with my definition of “drug” is that it renders things 
drugs that we do not typically consider to be drugs. For instance, it renders a 
bullet (or an arrow, knife, or what have you) lodged in a conscious individual’s 
head a drug, since a bullet is a substance that, when so lodged, has psychoac-
tive effects.44 (Indeed, in 2007, after waking up one day with a severe headache, 
Michael Moylan asked his wife to drive him to the hospital. Once there, he was 
told that a bullet was embedded in his head. It turns out that his wife had shot 
him in the head while he was sleeping.45) To circumvent this, I will supplement 
the preceding definition of “drug” with an ostensive definition of “drug”— that 
is, a definition involving examples. So the substances that have psychoactive 
effects that I have in mind include, but are not limited to, the following:
 • caffeine (specifically its active ingredient, methylxanthine)
 • tobacco (nicotine)
 • alcohol (ethanol)
 • marijuana (tetrahydrocannabinol or THC)
 • cocaine (benzoylmethylecgonine)
 • mushrooms (psilocybin)
 • acid (lysergic acid diethylamide or LSD)
 • ecstasy (3,4- methylenedioxy- methamphetamine or MDMA)
 • speed (methamphetamine)
 • heroin (diacetylmorphine)
Supplementing my original definition of “drug” with this ostensive defini-
tion does not leave my definition entirely free from defect, of course. It 
does, however, suffice to make it rather clear what I mean by “drug.”
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Granted, some individuals might object to my definition of “drug” on 
the grounds that, while most people refer to marijuana, cocaine, and her-
oin as drugs, most people do not refer to tobacco and alcohol as drugs. 
Take, for instance, the following claim: “Not everyone who tries cigarettes, 
drugs or alcohol continues to use them.”46 The author of this claim dis-
tinguishes cigarettes (and, with them, tobacco) and alcohol from drugs, 
thereby referring to tobacco and alcohol as if they are not drugs. And he is 
not alone in doing so. According to one survey, though 95 percent of adults 
recognize heroin as a drug, only 39 percent recognize alcohol as a drug and 
just 27 percent recognize tobacco as a drug.47 Indeed, referring to tobacco 
(or, more specifically, nicotine) and alcohol as if they are not drugs is so 
common that even those who hold that they are drugs occasionally refer 
to them as if they are not. For example, in his The Addicted Brain, Michael 
Kuhar states explicitly that both nicotine and alcohol are drugs: “When 
talking about drugs that can be abused, there are about seven different 
groups of substances. There are nicotine; sedatives such as alcohol, bar-
bituates, benzodiazepines, and inhalants such as fumes from glue; opiates 
such as heroin and morphine; psychostimulants such as cocaine, amphet-
amine, and methamphetamine; marijuana; hallucinogens; and caffeine.”48 
And yet the subtitle for The Addicted Brain is Why We Abuse Drugs, Alcohol, 
and Nicotine, an odd choice to say the least, for though the preceding pas-
sage makes it clear that Kuhar believes nicotine and alcohol are drugs, this 
subtitle suggests he simultaneously believes the contrary.
But referring to nicotine and alcohol as if they are not drugs is simply 
misguided, or so the experts on drugs and drug use maintain.49 As one 
such expert, Howard Abadinsky, writes, “Although nicotine and alcohol are 
clearly dangerous psychoactive chemicals— drugs— semantic fiction por-
trays them otherwise. Statutory vocabulary and social folklore have estab-
lished the fiction that alcohol and nicotine are not really drugs at all.”50 
Despite the fact that most people do not refer to nicotine and alcohol as 
drugs, then, they are properly understood to be drugs.
By “recreational drug use,” I mean the use of a psychoactive substance 
for the purpose of some positive, nonmedical effect. More specifically, and 
as Husak puts it, it is drug use “that is intended to promote the pleasure, 
happiness, or euphoria of the user. The more specific purposes that are 
encompassed under this broad umbrella include sociability, relaxation, 
alleviation of boredom, conviviality, feelings of harmony, enhancement 
of sexuality, and the like.”51 Caffeine, tobacco, alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, 
mushrooms, ecstasy, acid, heroin— these and many other drugs are regu-
larly used recreationally by billions of people around world.52
To avoid confusion, it is important to distinguish my understanding 
of recreational drug use from another understanding of recreational drug 
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use. Notice that my understanding of recreational drug use is grounded 
in why the drug is used— namely, for the purpose of some positive, non-
medical effect. There is another understanding of recreational drug use, 
however, one that is grounded, at least in part, in how often the drug is 
used. Consider, for example, the following claim: “There has been a docu-
mented rise in ‘recreational drug use’— occasional use of a wide range of 
substances including amphetamines, cocaine, ecstasy, LSD and even her-
oin, usually with more regular use of alcohol, cannabis and tobacco.”53 The 
author of this claim adopts an understanding of recreational drug use that 
is grounded partly in how often the drug is used. Not only does “occasional 
use” indicate this, but so does the author’s contrasting recreational drug use 
with “more regular use” of alcohol, cannabis, and tobacco. I mention this 
other understanding of recreational drug use, not because I find it prob-
lematic, but because I want to make clear from the outset that I will not be 
relying on it.54
An additional remark about “recreational drug use” is in order. Of the 
myriad activities that one might subject to moral evaluation, recreational 
drug use is among the more complex, which in turn makes determining its 
moral status rather complicated. The complexity of recreational drug use 
is the result of numerous factors— indeed, too many to cover here. Fortu-
nately, consideration of just two suffices to make the point.
To begin with, both in practice and in principle, recreational drug use 
can be a strictly self- regarding activity— that is, an activity that affects the 
user alone.55 However, at least in practice and if not also in principle, it also 
can be an other- regarding activity— that is, an activity that affects another 
(or others) beyond the user himself or herself. And that recreational drug 
use can be a strictly self- regarding activity as well as an other- regarding 
activity not only makes it complex but also renders determining its moral 
status quite complicated, particularly relative to activities that cannot be 
strictly self- regarding. For, when determining the moral status of recre-
ational drug use, one must distinguish between those instances of rec-
reational drug use that are strictly self- regarding and those that are not. 
(This leads to the division between Chapters 2 and 3. The former pertains 
to the harms of recreational drug use to the user himself or herself while 
the latter pertains to the harms of recreational drug use to someone other 
than the user.) While, when determining the moral status of activities that 
cannot be strictly self- regarding, such as theft or rape, one need not dis-
tinguish between those instances that are strictly self- regarding and those 
that are not, since there are no instances that are strictly self- regarding. In 
this respect, recreational drug use is more complex than activities that can-
not be strictly self- regarding, which, in turn, makes determining its moral 
status rather complicated.
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Another factor that makes recreational drug use complex, one related 
to the previous factor, has to do with what, exactly, recreational drug use is 
understood to encompass. Notice that recreational drug use is understood 
here to encompass not only the administration of the drug (the injection, 
inhalation, snort, etc.) but its subsequent effects as well. This is the typi-
cal way of understanding recreational drug use, of course, particularly in 
moral and legal debates on the issue, and reasonably so. If recreational 
drug use were understood to encompass merely the administration of the 
drug and not its subsequent effects, then recreational drug use would begin 
and end with each instance of drug administration— that is, with each 
injection, inhalation, snort, or what have you. In turn, the moral and legal 
debates on recreational drug use would be about whether, for instance, the 
mere act of inhaling smoke from smoldering marijuana, independent of 
the subsequent effects of doing so, is wrong or should be illegal. This is an 
intelligible question, certainly, but it is not one that seems worthy of much, 
if any, moral or legal consideration.
There is good reason, then, for understanding recreational drug use 
as encompassing the administration of the drug as well as its subsequent 
effects. But doing so introduces a complexity. On such an understanding, 
recreational drug use does not begin and end with each instance of drug 
administration. Rather, it begins with the initial administration of the drug 
and, due to the lasting subsequent effects, ends sometime after the final 
administration of the drug. As a result, recreational drug use is an activ-
ity that is not fixed to the context in which it begins; it can move, as it 
were, from one context to another. For example, it can begin in a relatively 
innocuous context, such as when the marijuana user takes his or her first 
hit of pot alone in his or her home, but then move to a potentially harmful 
context, such as when the newly intoxicated user leaves his or her home 
and drives somewhere. And this makes the activity of recreational drug 
use more complex than activities that seemingly are fixed to the context in 
which they begin, such as, again, theft or rape. This, in turn, significantly 
complicates determining recreational drug use’s moral status.
There are other factors at work when it comes to what renders recre-
ational drug use complex and the determination of its moral status quite 
complicated, such as that different drugs produce different psychoactive 
effects, that different drug amounts and routes of administration cause dif-
ferent bodily reactions, and that different drug users have different drug- 
use histories, expectations, and levels of tolerance. These and many other 
factors shall be covered in subsequent chapters. But these two— that recre-
ational drug use can be a strictly self- regarding activity as well as an other- 
regarding activity and that it can move from context to context— will do 
for now.
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Finally, by an act that is “wrong,” I mean an act that is morally imper-
missible as opposed to an act that is morally criticizable.56 Acts that are 
morally impermissible are acts that one has no moral right to perform. 
For present purposes, an act that one has no moral right to perform is an 
act that someone, whether oneself or another, has a valid claim against one 
performing. I write “whether oneself or another,” since it seems at least 
logically possible for one to have a valid claim against one’s own perfor-
mance of a given activity, even one that is strictly self- regarding. (What 
constitutes a valid claim against one’s performing an act is, of course, an 
issue at once metaethical and normative ethical in nature. I will have more 
to say on this in a moment.) Acts that are morally criticizable, on the other 
hand, are acts that one has a moral right to perform but, nevertheless, one 
should not, morally speaking, perform.
David Boonin, the philosopher from whom I borrow the distinction 
between moral impermissibility and moral criticizability, motivates it as 
follows:
Consider an imaginary billionaire named Donald who has just unexpect-
edly won a million dollars from a one- dollar lottery ticket. He is trying to 
decide what to do with the money and has limited himself to the following 
options: (1) donating the money to several worthy charities, (2) putting it 
in his savings account, (3) buying a gold- plated Rolls Royce, (4) putting up 
billboards across the country that read “I hate Ivana,” and (5) hiring a hit-
man to kill Ivana. One thing we are likely to say about this list is that there 
is a morally relevant sense in which the choices become progressively worse. 
We would be entitled to aim more moral criticism at Donald for choosing 
(4), for example, than for choosing (3). This is what I mean by calling an 
action morally criticizable. But most of us will be inclined to say something 
more than this: It isn’t just that (5) is worse than (4), which is worse than 
(3), which is worse than (2), which is worse than (1); it is that there is a dif-
ference in kind between (5) and the others. The difference might be put like 
this: Even though it is his money, and so there is some sense in which he is 
entitled to spend it in any way he wants, still he is not entitled to spend it in 
that way. This is the distinction I have in mind in saying (5) is impermissible 
while (1)– (4) are permissible.57
So though (2) is morally worse than (1), (3) is morally worse than (2), (4) 
is morally worse than (3), and so on, there is a significant moral differ-
ence between (2), (3), and (4), on the one hand, and (5), on the other. The 
former, though morally criticizable, are nevertheless morally permissible, 
while the latter is morally impermissible.
Although the concept of moral impermissibility is familiar to most 
people, the concept of moral criticizability is not as familiar. Accordingly, I 
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would like to provide further motivation for the latter by invoking the dis-
tinction between a prudential “should” and a moral “should” once again. 
Suppose Donald decides to do (3) and thus purchases a gold- plated Rolls 
Royce. By deeming his doing so morally criticizable, as opposed to mor-
ally impermissible, one holds that Donald does something he is morally 
permitted to do but, nevertheless, should not do. By deeming his doing so 
morally criticizable, as opposed to prudentially criticizable, one holds that 
Donald does something he should not do regardless of his desires, inter-
ests, purposes, or needs. Tying these two things together, to deem Donald’s 
purchase of a gold- plated Rolls Royce morally criticizable is to deem it 
something he is morally permitted to do but should not do regardless of 
his desires, interests, purposes, or needs. There may be many reasons why 
one thinks that Donald should not purchase a gold- plated Rolls Royce, of 
course. But whatever they may be, one thing is certain: they extend beyond 
his desires, interests, purposes, and needs. This is due to the fact that Don-
ald’s purchase of a gold- plated Rolls Royce is deemed morally, not simply 
prudentially, criticizable.
The distinction between morally impermissible activities and morally 
criticizable activities is important for three reasons, the first of which is 
that, as indicated earlier, not everyone holds that recreational drug use is 
morally permissible. To be sure, some people are satisfied with the cursory 
moral defenses of recreational drug use that have been offered, and some 
people (including, alas, some philosophers) simply take it for granted that 
using drugs recreationally is morally permissible. But others do neither 
of these things, and rightly so as I see it. Regarding the former, cursory 
moral defenses of recreational drug use are usually light on argumentation, 
rigor, relevant empirical data, and morally relevant factors and distinc-
tions (among other things), and consequently, they tend to be inadequate. 
As for the latter, it probably goes without saying that simply taking it for 
granted that using drugs recreationally is morally permissible is no way to 
settle whether recreational drug use is, in fact, morally permissible. A natu-
ral starting point, then, is that of the question of whether recreational drug 
use is ever morally impermissible: hence my understanding “wrong” in 
terms of moral impermissibility and, in turn, my criticisms being directed 
first and foremost at arguments for the moral impermissibility of recre-
ational drug use.
That said, it should be noted that my criticisms are also directed at 
arguments for recreational drug use’s moral criticizability, albeit sec-
ondarily, for many of the criticisms that follow can be directed at argu-
ments for the claim that recreational drug use is morally criticizable as 
well. So in addition to stating explicitly when I think arguments for the 
moral impermissibility of recreational drug use fail, I also state explicitly 
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when I think arguments for the moral criticizability of recreational drug 
use fail.
The second reason that the distinction between morally impermissible 
activities and morally criticizable activities is important, one related to the 
first, has to do with something to which I alluded previously: this book is 
likely the first of its kind. Again, I am not aware of anyone who has systemati-
cally and thoroughly examined arguments for the wrongness of recreational 
drug use. Given this, it would make little to no sense to bypass the question 
of whether recreational drug use is ever morally impermissible and focus 
exclusively on the question of whether recreational drug use is ever morally 
criticizable. To motivate this, imagine that the first book, or even the first 
few books, ever written on the moral status of, say, prostitution bypassed the 
question of whether prostitution is ever morally impermissible and focused 
exclusively on the question of whether prostitution is ever morally criticiz-
able. This would be a regrettable oversight if not a fatal flaw, even if some 
scholars working on this issue were convinced that prostitution was morally 
permissible. And so it would be here were I to bypass the question of whether 
recreational drug use is ever morally impermissible and focus exclusively on 
the question of whether recreational drug use is ever morally criticizable.
The third and final reason that the distinction between morally imper-
missible activities and morally criticizable activities is important is that 
the morality- based defense of the status quo position often involves the 
claim that recreational drug use is morally impermissible. That it does is 
understandable, of course, since arguing that recreational drug use should 
be illegal, indeed criminal, on the grounds that it is morally criticizable is 
unlikely to persuade anyone. Donald’s purchasing of a gold- plated Rolls 
Royce might be morally criticizable, for instance, but hardly anyone would 
be persuaded by the argument that it should therefore be criminalized. And 
so it is with most other activities (at least, generally construed) that people 
tend to deem morally criticizable, such as gossiping, ridiculing, boasting, 
slandering, insulting, teasing, disrespecting, and so on. Hardly anyone 
would be persuaded by the argument that these activities are morally criti-
cizable and should therefore be criminalized. All this to say, if individuals 
who embrace the morality- based defense of the status quo position were to 
agree that recreational drug use is not morally impermissible but, at worst, 
morally criticizable, they would thereby weaken their case for criminaliz-
ing recreational drug use. Those who embrace the morality- based defense 
of the status quo position seem to be well aware of this, as indicated by the 
fact that, as Husak writes, they “have felt a need to exaggerate the dangers 
of existing recreational drugs in order to justify their illegality.”58
By an act that is “wrong,” then, I mean an act that is morally impermis-
sible. Accordingly, my criticisms of the arguments for the wrongness of 
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recreational drug use are directed primarily at arguments for recreational 
drug use’s moral impermissibility. That said, they are also directed second-
arily at arguments for recreational drug use’s moral criticizability.
Another word about “wrong” is in order. Though moral critics of recre-
ational drug use claim that the recreational use of drugs such as marijuana, 
cocaine, and heroin is wrong, they often do not state explicitly whether they 
mean by this that recreational drug use is intrinsically wrong or extrinsically 
wrong. By an act that is “intrinsically wrong,” I mean an act that is wrong in 
and of itself; it is wrong independent of whatever consequences it happens to 
produce. By an act that is “extrinsically wrong,” on the other hand, I mean an 
act that is not wrong in and of itself; rather, it is wrong due to the consequences 
it happens to produce. To be sure, an act that is intrinsically wrong might also 
produce bad or otherwise undesirable consequences, but its wrongness does 
not depend on its doing so— that is, an act that is intrinsically wrong is wrong 
even when it produces neutral or good consequences. The wrongness of an 
extrinsically wrong act, on the other hand, does depend on its producing bad 
or otherwise undesirable consequences. Examples would be helpful here. For 
an example of an act that many would consider intrinsically wrong, killing an 
innocent person against his or her will— in a word, murder— is one such act. 
As for an example of an act that many would consider extrinsically wrong, 
consider a father who, rather than getting out of bed to feed his children, 
decides to stay in bed and rest for the remainder of the day.59 Now, resting 
in bed all day is not intrinsically wrong; it is not wrong in and of itself. How-
ever, the father’s resting in bed all day produces bad or otherwise undesirable 
consequences— namely, unfed children. The father’s resting in bed all day, 
then, would be considered by many to be extrinsically wrong; it is wrong due 
to the consequences it happens to produce.
So again, moral critics of recreational drug use often do not state explic-
itly whether they are claiming that recreational drug use is intrinsically 
wrong or extrinsically wrong. As a result, while evaluating arguments for 
the wrongness of recreational drug use, I will have both meanings in mind. 
Hereafter then, the claim “Recreational drug use is wrong” will be under-
stood both as “Recreational drug use is intrinsically wrong— that is, wrong 
in and of itself” as well as “Recreational drug use is extrinsically wrong— 
that is, wrong due to its consequences” (not simultaneously, of course). 
And my criticisms of the arguments will be reflective of this, with some 
criticisms being directed at the former understanding and others being 
directed at the latter understanding.
With the preceding discussion of what I mean by “wrong” in mind, one 
might wonder what makes morally impermissible acts morally impermis-
sible (and, relatedly, a valid claim against one’s performing an act a valid 
claim), morally criticizable acts morally criticizable, intrinsically wrong 
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acts intrinsically wrong, and extrinsically wrong acts extrinsically wrong. 
These are deep and difficult questions of metaethical and normative ethi-
cal theory. As such, they are beyond the scope of this work and, conse-
quently, I will not attempt to answer them here.60 I will, however, do what 
is perhaps the next best thing: I will rely on what I take to be paradigmatic 
cases of each of these kinds of acts. As paradigmatic, these cases are likely to 
be accepted by most people— again, and hereafter, most Westerners at any 
rate— as actual instances of each of these kinds of acts and, perhaps more 
important, deemed compatible with any number of moral theories. The 
work that I do here, then, might be described as taking place somewhere 
between the two extremes constitutive of the method of reflective equi-
librium: that of moral theory on the one end and moral intuition on the 
other.61 I begin neither with a particular, tentatively anchored moral theory 
nor with a particular, tentatively anchored moral intuition— not explic-
itly at any rate. Rather, I begin somewhere in between these two extremes, 
thereby allowing one to move back and forth between this or that moral 
theory and this or that moral intuition and, in turn, to attempt to establish 
reflective equilibrium on one’s own.
Of course, one is free to hold that no acts are morally impermissible, 
or morally criticizable, or intrinsically wrong, or extrinsically wrong, or 
even all of these and, in turn, to deduce the moral status of recreational 
drug use rather easily. To take just one example, one may hold that no 
acts are morally impermissible— à la moral nihilism— and, in turn, deduce 
that recreational drug use is not morally impermissible. One is also free to 
reject what I take to be paradigmatic cases of each of these kinds of acts or 
to challenge my comparing and contrasting recreational drug use to such 
cases. If one chooses to do any of these things, however, then the issue at 
hand shifts from the moral status of recreational drug use to that of which 
metaethical and normative ethical theories are correct. The latter issue is 
tremendously important, of course, but given its enormity and complexity, 
it is also an issue that is best addressed elsewhere.
Arguments for the Wrongness of Recreational Drug Use
Arguments for the wrongness of any activity, recreational drug use or 
other, may be divided into at least the following four different types:
 • Religious arguments: arguments that ground the wrongness of an 
activity in at least one religious claim
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 • Nonreligious arguments: arguments that ground the wrongness of an 
activity in nonreligious claims alone
 • Harm- based arguments: arguments that ground the wrongness of an 
activity in a claim about harm the activity involves, either to the 
agent or to someone other than the agent
 • Non- harm- based arguments: arguments that ground the wrong-
ness of an activity in a claim about the activity’s possession of some 
wrong- making property not identified with harm
Taking each in turn, religious arguments for the wrongness of an activity 
move from at least one religious claim to a claim about the wrongness of 
the activity. What, exactly, makes a religious claim a religious claim is an 
interesting and challenging question. Rather than attempting to answer it 
here, however, I will simply rely on standard examples of religious claims 
such as “The Creator loves us,” “The gods will punish the wicked,” “God 
commands us to refrain from lying,” and so on. Religious arguments may 
be stated formally as follows, with X standing for an activity and R standing 
for a religious claim. (For clarity’s sake, I will state the argument, as well as 
the rest of the arguments in this chapter, in syllogistic form.62)
 (1) R.
 (2) If R, then X is wrong.
 (3) Therefore, X is wrong.
What differentiates one religious argument from another, then, is the activ-
ity as well as the religious claim(s) on which it depends. With this in mind, 
consider an argument addressed in Chapter 6:
 (1) God commands that we refrain from recreational drug use.
 (2) If God commands that we refrain from recreational drug use, then 
recreational drug use is wrong.
 (3) Therefore, recreational drug use is wrong.
In this case, the activity is recreational drug use and the religious claim is 
“God commands that we refrain from recreational drug use.”
Nonreligious arguments for the wrongness of an activity move from 
nonreligious claims alone to a claim about the wrongness of the activity. 
For present purposes, what makes a nonreligious claim a nonreligious 
claim is simply the fact that it does not make any religious claims. Nonreli-
gious arguments may be stated formally as follows, with X standing for an 
activity and N standing for a nonreligious claim:
20   A MORAL DEFENSE OF RECREATIONAL DRUG USE
 (1) N.
 (2) If N, then X is wrong.
 (3) Therefore, X is wrong.
What differentiates one nonreligious argument from another, then, is the 
activity as well as the nonreligious claim(s) on which it depends. With this 
in mind, consider an argument addressed in Chapter 4:
 (1) By using drugs recreationally, the user degrades himself or herself.
 (2) If, by using drugs recreationally, the user degrades himself or herself, 
then recreational drug use is wrong.
 (3) Therefore, recreational drug use is wrong.
In this case, the activity is recreational drug use and the nonreligious 
claims include “by using drugs recreationally, the user degrades himself or 
herself” and “recreational drug use is wrong.”63
Harm- based arguments for the wrongness of an activity move from a 
claim about a harm the activity involves to a claim about the wrongness 
of the activity. By “harm,” I mean an adverse effect on someone’s or some-
thing’s (e.g., society’s) interests.64 Harm- based arguments may be stated 
formally as follows, with X standing for an activity, S standing for the sub-
ject of harm, and H standing for a harm:
 (1) X is harmful to S with respect to H.
 (2) If X is harmful to S with respect to H, then X is wrong.
 (3) Therefore, X is wrong.
What differentiates one harm- based argument from another, then, is the 
activity, the subject of the harm, and the harm the activity is said to involve. 
With this in mind, consider an argument addressed in Chapter 2:
 (1) Recreational drug use damages the user’s brain and, with it, his or 
her mental faculties.
 (2) If recreational drug use damages the user’s brain and, with it, his or 
her mental faculties, then recreational drug use is wrong.
 (3) Therefore, recreational drug use is wrong.
In this case, the activity is recreational drug use, the subject of the harm 
is the user himself or herself, and the harm is that of damage to the user’s 
brain and mental faculties.
Non- harm- based arguments for the wrongness of an activity, on the 
other hand, move from a claim about the activity’s possession of some 
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wrong- making property not identified with harm to a claim about the 
wrongness of the activity. It is important to make very clear the signifi-
cant difference between harm- based arguments and non- harm- based 
arguments. With the former, the wrongness of the activity depends on the 
activity being harmful; with the latter, it does not. To be sure, it might be 
that the wrong- making property involved in a non- harm- based argument 
also renders the activity harmful to those who engage in it. But the wrong-
ness of the activity does not depend on its doing so as with harm- based 
arguments; the activity possessing the wrong- making property not iden-
tified with harm would still be wrong even if it were not harmful. Non- 
harm- based arguments may be stated formally as follows, with X standing 
for an activity and P standing for a wrong- making property not identified 
with harm:
 (1) X possesses the wrong- making property P.
 (2) If X possesses the wrong- making property P, then X is wrong.
 (3) Therefore, X is wrong.
What differentiates one non- harm- based argument from another, then, 
is not only the activity but also the wrong- making property the activity 
is said to possess. With this in mind, consider an argument addressed in 
Chapter 5:
 (1) Recreational drug use is unnatural.
 (2) If recreational drug use is unnatural, then recreational drug use is 
wrong.
 (3) Therefore, recreational drug use is wrong.
In this argument, the activity is recreational drug use and the wrong- 
making property is that of being unnatural.
As one can see, these types of arguments for the wrongness of recre-
ational drug use— these types of arguments against recreational drug use, 
for short— may be conjoined in various ways. For example, one could con-
join religious arguments and harm- based arguments, religious arguments 
and non- harm- based arguments, nonreligious arguments and harm- based 
arguments, nonreligious arguments and non- harm- based arguments, and 
so on. In the chapters to come, I do just that. Specifically, in Chapter 2, I 
evaluate nonreligious harm- based arguments that focus on harm to the 
user— that is, that focus on self- regarding harm. In Chapter 3, I evalu-
ate nonreligious harm- based arguments that focus on harm to someone 
other than the user— that is, that focus on other- regarding harm. In Chap-
ter 4, I evaluate nonreligious non- harm- based arguments linked by the 
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concepts of instrumentalization, addiction, and degradation. In Chapter 5, 
I continue to evaluate nonreligious non- harm- based arguments, this time 
linked by the concept of pleasure. And in Chapter 6, I evaluate religious 
arguments, both harm- based and non- harm- based.65
There is yet another way in which these types of arguments may be con-
joined, though it is one that I do not address here, which is by conjoining 
harm- based arguments and non- harm- based arguments. One could, for 
example, conjoin the Addiction Argument (a non- harm- based argument 
for present purposes) and the Harm to Dependents Argument (a harm- 
based argument).66 However, since presenting and evaluating harm- based 
arguments and non- harm- based arguments independently is a compli-
cated and demanding affair unto itself (as will be evidenced shortly), I do 
not conjoin harm- based arguments and non- harm- based arguments and 
evaluate the resultant arguments. (For those who would like to do this on 
their own, see the following endnote.67)
Additional Comments on the Arguments
A few more words about the arguments to be addressed in the following 
chapters are required. First, while attempting to determine whether recre-
ational drug use is ever wrong, I have in mind any drug, illegal or legal, that 
may be used recreationally, including but not limited to caffeine, tobacco, 
alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, mushrooms, ecstasy, methamphetamine, and 
heroin. That said, the arguments that follow tend to be raised against par-
ticular drugs that are used recreationally, normally those that are illegal. 
This is due to the fact that very few people deem recreational use of all 
drugs to be wrong. As Husak writes, “Few of us believe that people behave 
immorally when they use alcohol, caffeine, or tobacco products. Moral con-
demnation is generally reserved for those drugs that are illicit.”68 Accord-
ingly, the recreational use of illegal drugs, such as marijuana, cocaine, and 
heroin, is of particular importance in this book.
But if the arguments that follow tend to be raised against the recre-
ational use of illegal drugs, why do I have in mind any drug that may be 
used recreationally? Simply put, because this is what thinking rationally 
about the moral status of recreational drug use involves. To see this, con-
sider the following case of recreational drug use:
A terrifying new “legal high” has hit our streets. Methylcarbonol, known by 
its street name “wiz,” is a clear liquid that causes cancer, liver problems, and 
brain disease, and is more toxic than ecstasy and cocaine. Addiction can 
occur after just one drink, and addicts will go to any lengths to get their next 
INTRODUCTION   23
fix— even letting their kids go hungry or beating up their partners to obtain 
money. Casual users can go into blind rages when they’re high, and police 
have reported a huge increase in crime where the drug is being used. Worst 
of all, drink companies are adding “wiz” to fizzy drinks and advertising them 
to kids like they’re plain Coca- Cola. Two or three teenagers die from it every 
week overdosing on a binge, and another ten from having accidents caused 
by reckless driving. “Wiz” is a public menace.69
In this case, wiz is a legal drug that is used recreationally. Yet given its effects 
on both the user and others, its legal status is ultimately irrelevant when 
it comes to determining the moral status of its use; that wiz is a legal drug 
in no way ameliorates the bad or otherwise undesirable consequences 
that may arise from its use, including harm to the user, harm to others, 
violations of others’ moral rights, and so on. Thinking rationally about 
the moral status of using wiz, then, involves thinking about the use of 
wiz independent of its legal status. And so it is with every other drug that 
may be used recreationally, hence my inclusion of all such drugs. (Indeed, 
methylcarbonol, the active ingredient of wiz, is just another chemical name 
for ethanol, the active ingredient of a legal drug: alcohol.70)
And lest one think that the previous point depends on the negative 
effects of the drug in question, consider another case of recreational drug 
use:
Imagine a newly invented synthetic psychedelic, “Rhapsodol.” Rhapso-
dol provides an intense (but not unduly frightening) altered state, full of 
intellectually and aesthetically intriguing mental imagery, and a profound 
sense of love for all living creatures. These sensations last for approximately 
30 minutes and then vanish completely, producing absolutely no detectable 
changes in one’s life outlook or mental or physical functioning. They can 
only be experienced by sitting or lying in a completely stationary position; 
any abrupt physical movements end the psychedelic state and return one to 
a normal state. Moreover, because of neurochemical processes of adaptation, 
the effects can be experienced only once a day.71
Imagine also that Rhapsodol is an illegal drug that is used recreationally. 
Even so, given its effects on both the user and others, its legal status is ulti-
mately irrelevant when it comes to determining the moral status of its 
use; that Rhapsodol is an illegal drug in no way diminishes the innocuous 
and even desirable consequences that may arise from its use. So as earlier, 
thinking rationally about the moral status of using Rhapsodol involves 
thinking about the use of Rhapsodol independent of its legal status. And 
again, so it is with every other drug that may be used recreationally, hence 
my inclusion of all such drugs.
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The second thing that needs to be said about the following arguments 
regards their origins. Previously, I claimed that moral critics of recre-
ational drug use rarely offer reasons for thinking that recreational drug 
use is wrong. Again, as Husak puts it, “arguments for the alleged immoral-
ity of drug use are almost never produced; this judgment is typically put 
forward as a kind of brute moral fact or uncontrovertible moral intuition.” 
But if arguments for the wrongness of recreational drug use are “almost 
never produced,” and the wrongness of recreational drug use is typically 
put forward as a kind of “brute moral fact,” from where do all the argu-
ments to be evaluated in the following chapters come? They come from 
various sources. To begin with, some of the arguments have been presented 
by moral critics of recreational drug use themselves. This is consistent with 
the earlier claim regarding the paucity of arguments for the wrongness of 
recreational drug use, of course, for the claim is that moral critics of recre-
ational drug use rarely offer arguments for the wrongness of recreational 
drug use, not that they never do.
Other arguments have not been presented so much as they have been 
suggested by critics of recreational drug use, moral or otherwise. What I 
mean by “suggested” is that, even when critics’ arguments against recre-
ational drug use are not explicitly moralistic, they often involve moralistic 
overtones that hint at the moral impermissibility of recreational drug use. 
Perhaps the best way to demonstrate this is by example.
Take, for instance, a commercial produced by the Partnership for a 
Drug- Free America. The commercial features a young woman in a kitchen 
holding an egg in one hand and a frying pan in the other. “This is your 
brain,” she says, referring to the egg. “This is heroin,” she continues, refer-
ring to the frying pan. “This is what happens to your brain after snorting 
heroin,” she says just before smashing the egg with the frying pan. “And 
this is what your body goes through,” she continues while the yolk, white, 
and eggshell ooze down the bottom of the frying pan. She then proceeds 
to smash and destroy everything in the kitchen— the dishes, the clock, the 
faucet— while screaming “This is what your family goes through! And your 
friends! And your money! And your job! And your self- respect! And your 
future!” The commercial ends with her asking “Any questions?”72
The implicit claim here, of course, is that one should not snort heroin. 
But which sense of “should” is at work— the prudential or the moral? If 
the prudential sense is at work, then the implicit claim is that one should 
not snort heroin given one’s desires, interests, purposes, or needs. But if 
this is all the message amounts to, then the Partnership for a Drug- Free 
America, in the form of the young woman, doth protest too much. For if 
all that is at work is the prudential sense of “should,” one could reply (cor-
rectly, I might add, and to be addressed later) that, statistically speaking, 
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the probability of reaching such a level of loss through the recreational 
use of heroin— one involving the loss of one’s family and friends and 
money and future and so on— is rather low. One could even reply that one 
simply does not care about the possibility of losing these things. Given 
the commercial’s histrionics, I cannot help but think that the Partner-
ship for a Drug- Free America’s response to such replies would be “Even 
so, you should not snort heroin!” After all, one risks losing one’s family 
and friends and money and future by doing lots of things— riding motor-
cycles, for instance— but no one is spending large amounts of money to 
have kitchens destroyed, as it were, in an attempt to dissuade people from 
doing such things. These considerations indicate to me that more than 
the prudential sense of “should” is at work— that is, they indicate to me 
that the Partnership for a Drug- Free America is appealing to more than 
mere prudence. They indicate to me that the moral sense of “should” is at 
work as well. In sum, regarding the second source of the arguments to be 
evaluated, they have not been presented so much as suggested by critics of 
recreational drug use.
As for the third and final source of the arguments to be evaluated, 
they have been anticipated by me and are presented here for the first 
time. Accordingly, I have widened the circle of possible arguments for the 
wrongness of recreational drug use. The set of arguments for the moral 
impermissibility of recreational drug use includes not only old arguments, 
then, but also new ones. Indeed, some of the old arguments are redevel-
oped and expanded here, making them, to that extent, new.
My Method for Evaluating the Arguments
There are at least two ways in which one may learn about an individual’s 
method for evaluating arguments: directly or indirectly. One learns directly 
about an individual’s method for evaluating arguments by consulting the 
individual’s description of it. One learns indirectly about an individual’s 
method for evaluating arguments by consulting the individual’s use of it. If 
you prefer to learn directly about my method for evaluating the arguments 
in the following chapters, then you ought to read this section. If you prefer 
instead to learn indirectly about my method for evaluating the arguments, 
then you ought to skip this section.
The method to be employed here for evaluating arguments against rec-
reational drug use is one that is guided by the ideals of argumentation, 
clarity, and rigor. It is perhaps best described by way of illustration. Sup-
pose someone, I’ll call him “Joe,” submits the following argument, an argu-
ment discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 4:
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 (1) By using drugs recreationally, the user instrumentalizes himself or 
herself.
 (2) If, by using drugs recreationally, the user instrumentalizes himself or 
herself, then recreational drug use is wrong.
 (3) Therefore, recreational drug use is wrong.
The first methodological step for evaluating this argument involves 
checking the logic— that is, it involves attempting to determine whether 
the conclusion (3) may be derived (follows) from the premises (1) and (2). 
If the conclusion does not follow from the premises, then the argument is 
judged fallacious. If the conclusion does follow from the premises, then 
it is determined whether it does so necessarily or probably. A conclusion 
follows necessarily from the premises if it must be true given the truth of 
the premises. A conclusion follows probably from the premises, not if it 
must be true given the truth of the premises, but merely if it is likely to be 
true given their truth. In Joe’s argument, the conclusion does indeed follow 
from the premises and does so necessarily.
The next five steps involve examining the premises and determining 
which, if any, are one or more of the following:
 (a) a moral claim
 (b) a nonmoral claim
 (c) a basic moral claim
 (d) a derived moral claim
 (e) a true claim
Regarding steps (a) and (b), a moral claim is a claim about the moral 
status of an act, person, or state of affairs. In the case of an act, it is a claim 
about an act being morally wrong (impermissible), morally permissible, 
or morally required.73 While in the case of a person or state of affairs, it 
is a claim about the person or state being morally bad, morally good, or 
morally exemplary. In Joe’s argument, premise (2)— if, by using drugs rec-
reationally, the user instrumentalizes himself or herself, then recreational 
drug use is wrong— is a moral claim. A nonmoral claim, on the other hand, 
is a claim that is not about the moral status of an act, person, or state of 
affairs. What a nonmoral claim is about varies from one nonmoral claim 
to the next, of course. In Joe’s argument, premise (1) is probably a non-
moral claim, one about how recreational drug use instrumentalizes the 
user. I write “probably,” since the word “instrumentalize” is unclear, and 
some people might use “instrumentalize” in a nonmoral sense, while oth-
ers might use it in a moral sense. Thus, in order to be confident that prem-
ise (1) is in fact a nonmoral claim, one would need to establish what Joe 
INTRODUCTION   27
means by “instrumentalize.” (Hereafter, I will simply assume that premise 
[1] is indeed a nonmoral claim.)
As for steps (c) and (d), since I cannot improve on Michael Tooley’s 
articulation of the distinction between basic and derived moral claims, 
I will quote it here. But before doing so, it should be noted that Tooley 
writes in terms of moral principles rather than moral claims. This differ-
ence, however, is insignificant for present purposes, since Tooley’s moral 
“principles” and my moral “claims” function equivalently in the relevant 
respect— namely, as statements of what is believed to be a moral truth. 
That said, Tooley’s articulation of the distinction between basic and derived 
moral claims is as follows: “A moral principle is basic if its acceptability is 
not dependent upon any nonmoral facts. It is a derived moral principle if it 
is acceptable only because it is entailed by one or more basic moral princi-
ples together with propositions expressing some nonmoral facts.”74 (Notice 
that, so construed, this distinction allows for a basic moral claim to be 
derived from other basic moral claims alone— more on this in a moment.)
Given that a moral claim is basic if its acceptability is not dependent 
on any nonmoral facts, a moral claim is basic for an individual if no con-
ceivable changes to nonmoral assumptions or beliefs can make him or her 
revise the claim. And given that a moral claim is derived if it is acceptable 
only because it is entailed by one or more basic moral claims together with 
propositions expressing some nonmoral facts, a moral claim is derived for 
an individual if changes to nonmoral assumptions or beliefs can make him 
or her revise the claim. In other words, a basic moral claim is a claim that 
is believed to be true in all conceivable nonmoral factual circumstances, 
while a derived moral claim is a claim that is believed to be true “in the 
actual world because it is entailed by the combination of some basic moral 
principle . . . together with some nonmoral principle that is contingently 
true in the actual world.”75 The acceptability of basic moral claims, then, is 
not contingent on nonmoral assumptions or beliefs as is the acceptability 
of derived moral claims.
With the preceding distinction in mind, let us consider premise (2) 
of Joe’s argument: If, by using drugs recreationally, the user instrumen-
talizes himself or herself, then recreational drug use is wrong. If it turns 
out that Joe will revise this moral claim under certain nonmoral factual 
circumstances, such as, say, when using drugs recreationally will prevent 
an even greater degree of self- instrumentalization, then the moral claim is 
not basic for Joe but instead is derived. Now, suppose Joe does revise the 
original moral claim so that it becomes the following: If, by using drugs 
recreationally, the user instrumentalizes himself or herself unnecessarily, 
then recreational drug use is wrong. If it turns out that Joe will not revise 
this moral claim under any nonmoral factual circumstances, such as, say, 
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when the recreational drug user is just like a standard adult human being 
in every way save for belonging to an alien species, then the moral claim is 
basic for him.
The importance of determining which moral claims are basic and 
which are derived pertains to what is involved when attempting to estab-
lish whether a moral claim is true. If the moral claim is derived, then 
establishing whether it is true involves establishing whether the claims 
from which it is said to be derived— both moral and nonmoral— are 
themselves true. If the moral claim is basic, however, then establishing 
whether it is true does not involve the preceding, as basic moral claims 
are not derived from sets of moral and nonmoral claims. Instead, estab-
lishing whether a basic moral claim is true involves considering its 
logical implications, employing thought experiments, raising possible 
counterexamples, appealing to intuition, and more.76 To wit, since a 
false claim, whether moral or nonmoral, cannot be deduced from a true 
claim, establishing whether a basic moral claim is true involves deter-
mining whether a false moral claim can be deduced from it— hence con-
sidering the basic moral claim’s logical implications. And since a basic 
moral claim is taken to be true regardless of changes to one’s nonmoral 
assumptions or beliefs, establishing whether it is true involves applying it 
to cases wherein changes have been made to nonmoral assumptions and 
beliefs— hence employing thought experiments, raising possible coun-
terexamples, appealing to intuition, and so on.
Finally, regarding step (e), determining whether nonmoral claims are 
true is rather straightforward. In some cases, it is simply a matter of estab-
lishing whether the nonmoral claim corresponds to reality; if it does then 
it is true, and if it does not then it is false.77 In other cases, it is a matter of 
establishing whether the nonmoral claim follows, necessarily or probably, 
from at least one other nonmoral claim that corresponds to reality; if it 
does then it is true or likely to be true, and if it does not then it is false or 
likely to be false. In Joe’s argument, the presumed nonmoral claim, premise 
(1), might be true, depending on whether the user does in fact instrumen-
talize himself or herself through recreational drug use.
When determining whether moral claims are true, however, things 
are not so straightforward. In order to do so, one must consult plausible 
moral theories, analyze moral concepts, check for logical inconsistencies, 
consider the moral claim’s logical implications, employ thought experi-
ments, raise possible counterexamples, appeal to intuition, and more. All 
these things, to one degree or another, are normally involved in the attempt 
to determine whether moral claims are true. In Joe’s argument, the moral 
claim, premise (2), might be true, depending on whether instrumentaliz-
ing oneself is in fact wrong, among other things.
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Before bringing this section to a close, I feel I should say a little more 
about one of the previously listed truth- testing considerations, intuition, 
as its role in moral reasoning has been and continues to be of considerable 
debate. Specifically, I would like to state very briefly what I take intuition’s 
role in moral reasoning to be.
There are, of course, numerous understandings of “intuition.”78 Follow-
ing Michael Huemer, “intuition” will be understood here as a state of its 
seeming to one that a claim, moral or nonmoral, is true wherein its seem-
ing so is the result, not of having inferred the claim from other claims, but 
merely of having reflected on the claim itself.79 With this meaning of “intu-
ition” in mind, I am inclined to think that intuition serves a twofold pur-
pose: (a) as a heuristic device and (b) as prima facie epistemic justification 
for accepting basic moral claims, at least when the intuition arises foremost 
from the claim’s intrinsic features and when it is shared by most people.80 
Beginning with the former, by serving as a starting point from which we 
may reason about moral issues, intuition helps us discover new moral ter-
rain, as it were— that is, new questions, concepts, and arguments of moral 
import. From ancient philosophy (for example, Plato’s thought experi-
ment involving the ring of Gyges) to contemporary philosophy (Judith 
Jarvis Thomson’s thought experiment involving the famous violinist, for 
instance) the history of moral philosophy is replete with examples of new 
moral terrain being discovered by way of an intuitive point of departure.
As for intuition serving as prima facie epistemic justification for accept-
ing basic moral claims, consider first that rejecting basic moral claims can 
be done on any number of grounds, such as those of the aforementioned 
truth- testing considerations. For example, a basic moral claim can be 
rejected on the grounds that a false moral claim can be deduced from it 
or that it is subject to counterexample. But accepting basic moral claims 
cannot be done simply on the basis of such considerations, for, even if a 
basic moral claim is not subject to counterexample and a false moral claim 
cannot be deduced from it, it still may be false. Furthermore, that it is not 
subject to counterexample and a false moral claim cannot be deduced from 
it do not, in and of themselves, make the basic moral claim more likely 
than not to be true.
On what grounds, then, is one to accept basic moral claims? One might 
think that it can be done on the basis of a derivation; specifically, one 
might think that a basic moral claim can be derived from other basic moral 
claims alone. But this just pushes the problem back, as the following ques-
tion arises: On what grounds is one to accept the other basic moral claims 
from which the basic moral claim is said to be derived? Or, one might think 
that, similar to some logical truths (such as the law of identity, according 
to which something is what it is), a basic moral claim can be accepted on 
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the basis of the obviousness of its truth.81 But one is hard pressed to find 
a basic moral claim that is so obviously true, if one is to be found at all.82 
Or, one might think that a basic moral claim can be accepted on the basis 
of its explanatory power or its practicality.83 But both of these possibilities 
are subject to a problem raised earlier, which is that, even if a basic moral 
claim has great explanatory power and is very practical, it still may be false.
What’s more— and more to the point— it seems at least logically pos-
sible that a basic moral claim can have great explanatory power and be 
very practical, and yet be counterintuitive as well. With this in mind, take 
two basic moral claims, one of which has great explanatory power and 
is very practical, and most people’s intuition, arising foremost from the 
claim’s intrinsic features, is that it is true. While the other has great explan-
atory power and is very practical, but most people’s intuition, also arising 
foremost from the claim’s intrinsic features, is that it is false. If intuition 
provides no epistemic justification whatsoever for accepting basic moral 
claims, then there is no epistemic reason to accept the former basic moral 
claim over the latter basic moral claim, all else being equal. But this strikes 
me as incorrect. That the former basic moral claim is intuitive, especially 
in the way that it is, seems to provide prima facie epistemic reason for 
accepting it over its counterpart. (Admittedly, I am appealing to intuition 
here; for what it’s worth, I am inclined to think that such appeals are inevi-
table, not just in moral reasoning, but also in philosophical reasoning in 
general.) If this is correct, then intuition does in fact provide prima facie 
epistemic justification for accepting basic moral claims, at least when it 
arises foremost from the claim’s intrinsic features and when it is shared by 
most people.84 To be sure, it may be that basic moral principles are not to 
be accepted at all, since there is no epistemic justification whatsoever for 
doing so, as moral skeptics would have us believe. But for present purposes, 
I will be assuming that there is such justification for doing so.
So again, I am inclined to think that intuition serves not only as a heu-
ristic device but also as prima facie epistemic justification for accepting 
basic moral claims under certain conditions. Accordingly, I appeal to intu-
ition here. And though I am aware that not everyone agrees that intuition 
plays this twofold role, especially that of providing epistemic justification 
for accepting basic moral claims, I am also aware that many of my appeals 
to intuition do not require that they be understood in terms of the latter in 
order to be useful. In many cases, if my appeals to intuition are understood 
to function merely as heuristic devices, they will have served their purpose.
This, at least in broad strokes, is the method to be employed here for 
evaluating arguments against recreational drug use. As one can see, it is 
indeed guided by the ideals of argumentation, clarity, and rigor. Before 
moving on, however, an important caveat is in order, one that I suspect 
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you will embrace. While employing this method in the following chapters, 
I do so without always stating explicitly which elements of the method are 
at work at any given moment. To do the latter would be mind- numbingly 
tedious and repetitive, both for you and for me. Accordingly, I trust that 
you will be able to decipher which elements of the method are at work at 
any given moment on your own.
Conclusion
Given the statistics presented at the beginning of this chapter, it is clear 
that recreational drug use is alive and well in the United States. And that it 
is, particularly when juxtaposed with the possibility of inconsistent beliefs 
that people may have regarding its moral status as well as the morality- 
based defense of the status quo position, makes recreational drug use an 
activity especially worthy of moral evaluation. Even so, as Husak observes, 
“Moral and political philosophers— indeed, philosophers in general— have 
been strangely silent in the drug policy debate.”85 As a result of this silence, 
there is an important hole in the drug- policy debate that needs closing: 
that of recreational drug use’s moral status and, specifically, whether it is 
ever wrong. In what follows, I attempt not only to close this hole but also to 
argue that, by and large, arguments for the wrongness of recreational drug 
use do not succeed.
While attempting to demonstrate that arguments for the wrongness of 
recreational drug use are largely unsuccessful, I hope to accomplish some-
thing else: to underscore the importance of evidence and argumentation 
with respect to one’s beliefs about the morality of recreational drug use. 
As Andrew Weil writes, “Drugs are not an emotionally neutral topic of dis-
course . . . This is so precisely because the issues raised by drugs touch so 
closely upon our profoundest hopes and fears.”86 This leads to the undue 
influence of emotions, anecdotal evidence, prejudices (racial, class, etc.), 
and other nonrational and irrational factors in legal and moral debates on 
the issue.87 And, as a result, recreational drug use is “among a small hand-
ful of issues that seem almost immune to rational debate” and “[e]vidence 
has little bearing on the kind of moral beliefs many people hold” regard-
ing it.88 But if one is to determine whether recreational drug use is in fact 
wrong, one should not permit these nonrational and irrational factors to 
have such influence, as doing so increases the likelihood that the conclu-
sion at which one arrives will be unfounded.89 If one wants to arrive at 
well- founded conclusions, one ought to rely first and foremost on evidence 
and argumentation, something of which I will attempt to persuade you by 
doing just that here.
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Two more concluding remarks are in order. First, and following John 
Stuart Mill, unless otherwise indicated, any claim regarding the moral sta-
tus of recreational drug use is meant to apply only to “human beings in the 
maturity of their faculties”— that is, to standard adult human beings.90 It 
is because of this that the Harm to Adolescents Argument, and the various 
versions thereof, are presented and evaluated independently of the other 
arguments.
Second, though I have attempted to be thorough, more can and, I hope, 
will be written about arguments for the wrongness of recreational drug 
use. In striving for thoroughness, I chose to cast my net wide so as to cover 
as many arguments as was reasonable within a fixed word limit. By choos-
ing breadth of argumentation, I had to sacrifice depth of argumentation 
on occasion; thus, some of the arguments, as well as some of the objections 
raised against them, may be developed even further. Accordingly, I do not 
consider this book to be the final word on the wrongness of recreational 
drug use— indeed, far from it. Instead, I like to think of this book as the 
beginning of a long and overdue rational discussion on the matter.
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